Trump Delays China Trip as Nobody Wants to Help Patrol the Strait of Hormuz

President Trump was supposed to fly to Beijing at the end of March for his first trip to China in his second term, a summit with Xi Jinping that was meant to stabilize the world's most consequential bilateral relationship. Instead, on Tuesday, he announced a postponement of "a month or so," citing the need to stay focused on the war in Iran. But the delay isn't just about scheduling. It's tangled up in a far more combustible issue: Trump's demand that China (and NATO, and Japan, and South Korea) send warships to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz. So far, nobody has volunteered.

What Happened

Trump had been scheduled to visit Beijing from March 31 to April 2. The trip was months in the making, designed to ease trade tensions, discuss tariff adjustments, and establish a working framework between the two administrations on everything from AI governance to the ongoing conflict in the South China Sea. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and a team of trade advisors had been conducting preparatory negotiations for weeks.

On Tuesday, speaking from the Oval Office during a meeting with Irish Prime Minister Micheal Martin, Trump said the U.S. had asked China to push the meeting back by about five or six weeks. "I'd love to go, but I need to be here," he said, pointing to the Iran conflict. He added that the rescheduled visit would happen in "about five or six weeks."

Bessent clarified that the delay was not intended to pressure Beijing specifically on the Hormuz issue. But the Washington Post reported that behind the scenes, the postponement is very much linked to Trump's frustration that China has not responded to his calls for Hormuz assistance.

The Hormuz Demand

The Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway between Iran and Oman through which roughly one-fifth of the world's traded oil normally flows, has been effectively closed since Iran began attacking commercial shipping in early March. Tanker traffic dropped by approximately 70% after the first attacks, and over 150 ships are anchored on either side of the strait waiting for safe passage. Major shipping companies including Maersk, CMA CGM, and Hapag-Lloyd have suspended transits entirely.

Trump's position is that the countries most dependent on Middle Eastern oil should share the burden of keeping the strait open. His argument is pointed: the United States gets relatively little of its oil from the Persian Gulf, while China, Japan, South Korea, and Europe are far more exposed. "They get their oil from there, not us," Trump has said repeatedly. "They should be sending their ships."

He has called on NATO, China, Japan, South Korea, Britain, and France to contribute naval escorts for commercial tankers. The response so far has been a wall of silence, or at best, noncommittal diplomatic language.

Why Nobody Is Joining

The refusal to join Trump's Hormuz coalition comes down to three factors.

First, the war itself is controversial. The U.S. and Israel launched strikes on Iran on February 28 without broad international consultation. Many nations, particularly in Europe and Asia, view the conflict as a war of choice rather than necessity. Asking those same nations to help manage the consequences of a war they didn't support is a tough sell.

Second, China's position is uniquely complicated. Beijing is Iran's largest oil customer and has maintained diplomatic ties with Tehran throughout the conflict. Iran has actually allowed some Chinese-flagged tankers selective passage through the strait, a signal that Beijing has leverage it can use quietly without sending warships. Deploying Chinese naval vessels alongside American ones in the Persian Gulf would fundamentally reshape China's posture in the Middle East, something Beijing has carefully avoided for decades.

Third, NATO is split. France and Britain have their own military commitments (Britain in the eastern Mediterranean, France dealing with domestic political upheaval after the municipal elections). Germany, which has the EU's largest economy but one of its smallest navies, lacks the capability for sustained Persian Gulf operations. And the broader NATO alliance is still absorbing the diplomatic shock of the U.S.-Israel strikes, which were not coordinated through NATO channels.

The Selective Passage Problem

One of the more fascinating dynamics of the Hormuz crisis is Iran's selective approach to the blockade. While broadly blocking commercial traffic, Iran has quietly allowed passage to vessels from specific countries. India confirmed that two Indian-flagged LPG tankers received safe passage in a "rare exception." Chinese-flagged supertankers have reportedly transited with minimal harassment.

This selective approach gives Iran enormous diplomatic leverage. By choosing who gets through and who doesn't, Tehran can divide the international response, rewarding countries that stay neutral and punishing those that support the U.S.-Israel coalition. It's a strategy that makes a unified international response nearly impossible, which is exactly the point.

For Trump, this creates a dilemma. If China can get its oil through quietly, Beijing has little incentive to risk its relationship with Tehran by sending warships. If India can negotiate passage for its tankers, New Delhi sees no reason to join an American-led naval coalition. The countries most affected by the blockade are finding workarounds, leaving the U.S. shouldering the military burden largely alone.

What the Delay Really Means

The postponement of the Beijing summit is more than a scheduling adjustment. It reflects a genuine strategic tension in American foreign policy. Trump launched the Iran war partly to project strength and partly in response to Iran's accelerating nuclear program. But the second-order consequences, a closed Strait of Hormuz, surging oil prices, and a diplomatic isolation on the Hormuz question, were either underestimated or accepted as costs worth paying.

Now those costs are arriving. Oil prices are above $100 per barrel. The U.S. is asking for help from allies and rivals alike and getting turned down. And the China relationship, which the administration identified as its top foreign policy priority, is on hold because of a Middle Eastern war that has spiraled beyond its original scope.

The rescheduled summit, expected in late April or early May, will take place in a fundamentally different context than originally planned. Instead of discussing trade normalization from a position of diplomatic confidence, Trump will arrive in Beijing needing something from Xi: help with Hormuz, oil price stabilization, or at minimum, a commitment not to undermine the Iran campaign diplomatically.

That's a weaker hand than the administration wanted to play, and Xi knows it.

What to Watch

The key variable is whether Iran maintains its blockade or begins allowing more commercial traffic as the war enters its fourth week. Israel has signaled plans for at least three more weeks of military operations, which means the Hormuz crisis is likely to persist into mid-April at a minimum.

If oil prices continue climbing and the economic damage mounts, the pressure on NATO allies and Asian partners to contribute to a Hormuz patrol will intensify. But so will the domestic political pressure on Trump to find a resolution to the war itself. The irony of the moment is that the trip meant to reset the U.S.-China relationship has been derailed by a conflict that is, inadvertently, making China's diplomatic position stronger. Beijing can afford to wait. Washington, increasingly, cannot.